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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No.

960203-CA

v.
ANGELO GIRON,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to bz searched, ar^ the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Constitution
Article I, section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effeces against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE RECORD ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE POUND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO
ARREST. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT, THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE
SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST EXCEPTION THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION APPORDS GREATER PROTECTION THAN THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, IS UNFOUNDED.
A.

Tfre Rqgprfl SWPQgtg the Search frg Incident tQ Arrqgt.

Defendant correctly notes that in Chimel v. California, 3 95
U.S. 752 (1969), the "Supreme Court ruled that contemporaneous
with arrest, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the area which the arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary items, i.e., the area within the arrestee's
"immediate control.1"

Id. at 763. Appellee's Br. at 12.

However, he mistakenly argues that the State made no showing that
Officer Bench's search of defendant's car was either
contemporaneous ("temporal proximity") or that following his
arrest his car was within his immediate control ("spatial
proximity").

Appellee's Br. at 12-13.

To the contrary, the

record describes a continuous flow of events, tightly
circumscribed in time and space.
Officer Bench caught sight of defendant on 300 North at 600
West, turned his patrol car around and engaged his lights and
siren.

When defendant finally stopped at 400 North and 610 West,

approximately one and one-half blocks from the point the officer
first sighted him, Officer Bench immediately arrested and
handcuffed defendant and placed him in the patrol car (R. 13 0,
154-55).

The officer's description of these events make it plain
2

that when defendant initially failed to respond to the siren and
lights that the officer followed defendant to the point at which
defendant finally stopped.

It is obvious that Officer Bench

would have drawn his patrol car close to defendant's car,
especially since defendant had already fled and then eluded the
officer earlier that evening.

This close proximity is supported

by Officer's Bench apparent mode of stopping vehicles by pulling
up immediately behind the targeted vehicle, as he had done when
he first encountered defendant earlier that evening (R. 125).
See State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1246 (U~ah App.), cert,
denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (search incident to arrest
upheld where defendant held in patrol car in the same parking lot
with the defendant's car).
Similarly, the record shows that the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest.

Defendant suggests that

"contemporaneous" refers to an immediate search following arrest.
Appellee's Br. at 13. However, "contemporaneous" only means
"occurring during the same period of time."
Unabridged Dictionary (2nd ed. 1996).

Random House Compact

Moreover, defendant cites

no authority stating that the arrest and incident arrest must be
virtually simultaneous.

Rather, in keeping with the spirit of

New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in which the Supreme
Court relieved officers of the requirement to make "hairline
distinctions" in effecting a search incident to arrest, see id.
at 458 (citation omitted), courts have upheld searches preceded
by a brief intervening act. £££, United States v. Willis. 37 F.3d
313, (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding search incident to arrest where
3

police officer first looked in his patrol car for camera to take
photographs); United States v. Harris. 617 A.2d 189, 193 (D.C.
App. 1992) (upholding search incident to arrest preceded by
reading the defendant his rights, searching him, and performing a
check to determine ownership of the car); 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search & Seizure § 7.1(c) (3rd ed. 1996) ("the fact that in
almost all cases the search will be undertaken at the place of
arrest is, as a practical matter, likely to overcome any problems
as to temporal proximity").
After placing defendant in the patrol car, Officer Bench
checked defendant's registration (R. 155). The record indicates
that immediately afterward Officer Bench searched defendant's car
(R. 11-12).
What defendant seems to suggest, by claiming inadequate
"time" or "spatial" proximity between his arrest and the
challenged search, is that the State must prove more than the
routine facts demonstrated in this case in order to justify the
search of his automobile.

But the Belton "search incident to

arrest" cases do not turn upon anything more detailed than a
routine, continuous sequence of events and normal physical
proximity between the arrestee and the searched area.

No

stopwatch and tape measure-based evidence was recited to justify
the searches, for example, in Belton and Moreno.

Indeed, despite

the oft-repeated assertion that search cases are "highly fact
intensive," e.g.. State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App.
1990), rert. denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), Belton was written
to eliminate excessively detail-focused analysis from the "search
4

incident to arrest'1 rule, and to institute a more
"straightforward" rule, providing more consistent results.

See

Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994) 'appellate court has duty to "say what the law is and
to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction"); State
v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (appellate review
fosters consistent "courtroom to courtroom" results); accord
Ornelas v. United States. 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662-63 (1996). The
trial court's suppression order, inconsistent with the Belton
case line, gave rise to an inconsistent, legally unsupportable
result in this case.
Defendant also argues that the search-incident to arrest
exception requires a showing of a threat to officer safety.
Appellee's Br. at 14-16.

In so arguing, defendant again

disregards the essence of Belton's bright-line rule, allowing a
search incident to a custodial arrest and relieving the officer
of the need to make a judgment about whether the search is
otherwise justified.

Belton. 453 U.S. at 458-61:

"The authority to search the person incident to a
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on
what a court may later decide was the probability in a
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment;
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to
arrest requires no additional justification."

IsL. at 461 (quoting United States v, Robinson, 414 u.s. 218, 235
(1973)).

£££ also State in re K . K . C 636 p.2d 1044, 1045-46

(Utah 1981) (per curiam) (upholding search incident to arrest of

5

juveniles upon viewing open beer bottles and a "roach" clip);
Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1246-49 (upholding search incident to arrest
where no showing of danger to officers);

United States v. Pino.

855 F.2d 357, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 493 U.S.
1090, 110 S. Ct. 1160 (1990) (upholding search incident to arrest
for traffic violation where no showing of danger to officers).
Utah cases cited by defendant,1 see Appellee's Br. at 15-16,
partly justify searches incident to arrest by noting demonstrable
danger to officers, but they do not require such showing.
Rather, they merely support Chimel's and Belton's underlying
rationale for search incident to arrest, to wit: the possibility
that weapons may be reached or evidence destroyed.
In any case, there was ample evidence justifying Officer
Bench's concern for his safety.

Currently assigned to the Metro

Gang Task Force, Officer Bench was patrolling an area known for
heavy drug and gang activity when he twice stopped defendant (R.
124, 143). From his earlier encounter with defendant, the
officer knew that defendant (1) kept company with at least one
person who would attempt to conceal suspected controlled
substances and who would run from police and be assisted by
surrounding residents in a fight with a police officer and (2)
that defendant would himself flee in spite of an officer's
specific instruction to remain in his place (R. 127-28).
1

When

State v. Kent. 665 P.2d 1317, 1318 (Utah 1983) (noting
that the presence of a shotgun and other suspects loose in an
area where shots were being fired presented an obvious threat to
safety); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 785 (Utah App. 1991)
(noting a separate safety concern in warrantless search of diaper
bag for murder weapon).
6

the officer stopped defendant the second time, defendant was
again with a strange male companion (R. 130). Under these
circumstances any officer would feel concern for his safety.
B.

The State Constitution Provides No Greater Protection

Than th« United States Constitution*
Citing various cases in which members of the Utah Supreme
Court have sought to clarify the automobile warrant exception to
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, defendant
argues that under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
there can be no warrantless search of an automobile without
probable cause and exigent circumstances.2

Therefore, he argues,

because there was no showing of probable cause to search his car,
his state constitutional rights were violated when Officer Bench
searched his car incident to arrest without a warrant.
Appellee's Br. at 17-20.
This Court should decline to review defendant's claim
because it was not adequately developed in the trial court.
"Mere allusion to state constitutional claims, unsupported by

2

Defendant particularly relies on State v. Larocco. 794
P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) (automobile exception under state
constitution requires "traditional justification, namely to
protect safety of police or the public or to prevent the
destruction of evidence," and a showing of probable cause and
exigent circumstances); State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (finding no basis under the
state constitution for a warrantless search "[o]nee the threat
that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons
or will destroy evidence is gone"); State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d
1229, 1239 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in result)
("I must point out that the lead opinion's directive to Utah
courts to construe article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
in a manner similar to constructions of the Fourth Amendment
except in compelling circumstances is not supported by a majority
of this court and is not Utah law").
7

meaningful analysis, does not permit appellate review."

State v.

Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Spuraeon.
904 P.2d 220, 224 n.2 (Utah App. 1995) ("the proper forum in
which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state
constitutional interpretation is before the trial court") (citing
State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)).

Defendant

made no mention of a separate state constitutional analysis in
either his motion to suppress or supporting memorandum (R. 45-46,
53-61).

At the suppression hearing, defendant inaccurately

indicated to the court that there existed a difference between
the Utah and United States Supreme Courts on the scope of search
incident to arrest, simply referring to Justice Zimmerman's
concurring opinion in Hygh and to Larocco. and asked, without any
legal analysis, that the two constitutions be applied differently
(R. 196-97).

Such nominal allusion to a state constitutional

argument fails to preserve it for appeal.

However, even on the

merits, defendant's claims are without merit.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the Utah Supreme Court has
failed to reach a consensus on the reach of article I, section
14, as distinguished from the Fourth Amendment.

Noting that,

that Larocco was only a plurality opinion, this Court noted:
The precedential value of the Larocco rationale is
somewhat unclear . . . because Justice Durham's
reasoning was joined only by Justice Zimmerman.
Justice Stewart concurred in the result, but provided
no insight into his rationale. Because he concurred
only in the result, and because Justice Durham arrived
at the result by using state constitutional analysis,
it is possible that Justice Stewart arrived at his
conclusion strictly through a Fourth Amendment
approach.

8

State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 985 n.2 (Utah App. 1992).

In

fact, Justice Stewart has subsequently stated that his
concurrence in Larocco. did not signal his acceptance of Justice
Durham's state constitutional analysis.

State v. Poole. 871 P.2d

531, 536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., concurring).

More recently,

the plurality in Anderson observed that *[the defendant's]
reliance on rLaroccol should be tempered by its plurality
status."

Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1234-35 n.5.

"The plurality

opinion in Larocco represents the views of only two justices of
this court and is therefore not the law of this state."

Id.

(citing Sims v, State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 15 (Utah 1992)
(Stewart, J., concurring in the result)).
Furthermore, the application of article I, section 14 beyond
its federal counterpart has proceeded only issue-by-issue.

See

e.g.. State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 1991) (having
recognized a distinct state constitutional analysis in other
contexts, uleav[ing] for another day the issue of whether to
apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule to article I, action 14 of the Utah
Constitution").

Defendant cites no Utah case applying a distinct

state constitutional analysis to the search incider.r. to arrest
exception, and the State has been unable to locate any.
Additionally, Chief Justice Zimmerman, along with Justice
Durham, whose state constitutional views defendant particularly
urges, has not categorically required that searches incident to
arrest fall within the usual requirements to the warrant
exception, namely a showing of probable cause and exigent
9

circumstances:

"Warrantless searches would be permitted only

where they satisfy their traditional justification--to protect
the safety of officers or to prevent the destruction of
evidence."

Hyah. 711 P.2d at 272 (Zimmerman, J., concurring)

(citing £]iiiii£l, 395 U.S. at 762-63) ) . fiaa alafi Larocco. 794 P.2d
at 469-70 (Justice Durham quoting Justice Zimmerman's remarks
from Hyah, above).
Common sense supports distinguishing the search incident to
arrest rationale from other warrantless searches which must be
justified by evidence supporting probable cause.

Police officers

will frequently make valid arrests in circumstances in which they
reasonably fear for their safety, but which do not support
probable cause to search for weapons.

See Strickling, 844 P.2d

at 982-84 (justifying weapons search, without any prior basis for
arrest, on the "prudent man" standard, citing Terry v. Ohio. 3 92
U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

Obviously, the Utah Supreme Court did not

intend to place police officers at frequent risk in the course of
developing the scope of article I, section 14.3 Further,
the State's reference to the weapons exception is not intended as
a concession that the search incident to arrest exception
requires any showing of actual threat to officer safety, but
rather that a showing of probable cause as to danger is a totally
3

Cases cited by defendant requiring probable cause under
the state constitution to justify a warrantless automobile search
neither discussed nor comprehended the search-incident-to-arrest
scenario. £££. Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d 6, 8-9 (Utah
1992) (invalidating suspicionless roadblock search); State v.
Morck. 821 P.2d 1190, 1192-93 (Utah App. 1991) (warrantless
search of truck for rifles used for poaching upheld on probable
cause based on informant's tip and officers' observations).
10

unwarranted reading of the cases. As noted above, no Utah
Supreme Court case has required a showing of danger to officers
before permitting a search incident to arrest.
Finally, departures from analogous federal constitutional
law may be appropriate when federal doctrine on a legal point has
become inconsistent and unworkable.

See Hygh. 711 P.2d at 271-72

(Zimmerman, J,, concurring); State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007
n.3 (Utah App. 1993).

However, with respect to the scope of a

search incident to arrest, federal under Belton is consistent.
Further, Utah courts have followed Belton since it was issued in
1981.

£££ K.K.C. . 636 P.2d at 1046; Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247-

48, 1249.

It would be inappropriate to impose stricter limits on

searches incident to arrest under the Utah Constitution.

Such a

ruling would contradict fifteen years of unbroken precedent, and
would create, rather than correct, inconsistency and confusion in
search and seizure law.

See Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1235.

The State's "search incident to arrest" argument was
properly presented in the trial court, and is in full accord with
settled law.

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial

court's order suppressing the evidence seized from defendant's
car, and the order should be dismissed.4
CONCLUSION
As set forth in Point I of this brief, this Court should
reverse the trial court's ruling, and hold that the search of

4

The State relies on its opening brief with respect to
defendant's responses supporting the tria-L court's order as to
impoundment and inventory search of defendant's car.
11

defendant's car was proper incident to his arrest.
Alternatively, reversal is also supported for the reasons
explained in Points II and III of the State's opening brief.
Contraband was lawfully seized from defendant's car, and
therefore is admissible at his trial.

The trial court's

suppression order and its order of dismissal should be reversed
and this matter remanded to the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2-r

day of February, 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

/
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KENNETH BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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